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COMMENTS

WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND THEY ARE
US: SAVING HUD FROM THEMSELVES AND
PROTECTING THE VIABILITY OF THE FAIR
HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT
Democracy is the form of government that gives every
man the right to be his own oppressor.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Once again Berkeley, California is the center of attention
involving a dispute about the freedom of speech guaranteed
by the First Amendment. 2 Thirty years ago, the young, intellectual elite protested parochial restrictions on speech that
were an impediment to the articulation of their societal vision.3 Ironically, thirty years later, one of the mechanisms
designed to bring about that societal vision is now ominously
chilling that very freedom.
In the summer of 1994, three Berkeley residents began
organizing political opposition to what they perceived to be
an egregious conflict of interest. 4 The local zoning board approved the conversion of a thirty-five room hotel into a permanent shelter for the homeless. 5 The residents felt that the
lack of public oversight, poor design, and conception of the
project were due to a conflict of interest on the zoning board.6
1.

JAMES R. LOWELL, AMERICAN IDEAS FOR ENGLISH READERS 11 (Boston,

J.G. Couples 1882).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
3. Michelle Locke, Free Speech Movement, the Spark for a Decade of Upheaval, Turns 30, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, at B1.
4. FairHousing Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1994) [hereinafter FairHousing Issues] (prepared testimony of Joseph J. Deringer, Resident of Berkeley, Cal.).
5. Id.

6. Id.
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A member of the zoning board was also a board member of
the nonprofit group that was developing the project.'
Although she did not vote on the project, she argued vigorously for its approval in front of her colleagues on the zoning
board.8
The residents' political organizing consisted of "attending
meetings and public hearings." 9 It also consisted of distributing leaflets, submitting petitions to local government officials,
publishing a local newsletter, and writing letters to the editor.10 The group also filed suit in Alameda County to require
a new zoning board vote."
Shortly after filing suit, a social service provider, who
was not associated with the controversial project, filed a one
sentence Fair Housing Complaint with the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) against the three
Berkeley homeowners.' 2 The complaint alleged that the
homeowners were "blocking the project because they perceive[d] the primary residents of the facility [would] be the
mentally disabled or the disabled through substance
abuse."' 3 Upon receipt of the complaint, HUD began a ten
month investigation, in which the Berkeley residents were
subjected to threats, intimidation, and an intractable federal
bureaucracy.14

HUD initiated its investigation with a letter stating that
a complaint had been lodged against the Berkeley residents;
the letter did not include any specifics to substantiate the
complaint."' Additionally, the letter threatened legal action
if the activities were not ceased immediately. 16 Finally, the
letter concluded with a request for all documents, correspondence, and membership lists associated with the protest.' 7
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Telephone Interview with Joseph J. Deringer, Resident of Berkeley,
California, and Defendant in Recent HUD Investigation (Nov. 16, 1994).
11. Id.
12. FairHousing Issues, supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Telephone Interview with Roger Conner, Executive Director, American
Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities, Amicus, Recent HUD Investigation
(Nov. 17, 1994).
16. FairHousing Issues, supra note 4.
17. Id.
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The Berkeley residents were frightened by the references to
heavy civil and criminal penalties for failure to comply with
HUD's requests.' 8
HUD never provided any indication that the Berkeley
residents had broken any laws, or even what their potential
offense was under the Fair Housing Act. 19 HUD did not respond to repeated requests for clarification.2 0 The residents,
promoted by fear and anger over the apparent callous and
willful trampling of their constitutional rights, attempted to
publicize their treatment in the media. 2 ' The subsequent
firestorm in the national media, which was in part due to the
existence of over thirty similar investigations across the
country, forced HUD to drop the investigation and issue new
guidelines for investigations.2 2
The experience of the Berkeley residents is not unique.
HUD's current enforcement procedures allow abusive filings
of housing discrimination complaints to chill legitimate public discourse. This comment addresses HUD's apparent
trampling of First Amendment rights of free speech and petition while enforcing the Fair Housing Act. 23 Part II examines: (1) the history and changes in the Fair Housing Act,
including the new enforcement provisions; (2) HUD's interpretation and implementation of the Act; and (3) how current
implementation results in unacceptable chilling of First
Amendment rights of free speech and petition.
Additionally, part II discusses how HUD's administration and implementation of the Act allows housing discrimination complaints to become strategic lawsuits that prevent
public participation in the policy making, democratic process.
Part II discusses the primacy of the First Amendment and
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Protests of Housing Plan Lead to HUD Inquiry,
and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at B1; Intimidating Political Protest,
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at A16; Heather MacDonald, HUD Continues Its
Assault on the First Amendment, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 19, 1994, at B13;
Mike Rosen, Seniors Added to HUD's Hit List, DENVER POST, Sept. 30, 1994, at
B11.
23. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
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how the Supreme Court, using the Noerr-Pennington2 4 doctrine, established a test to balance constitutional rights and
important legislative goals.
Part III examines how HUD's enforcement of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act, both in the past and under its current guidelines, allows unacceptable encroachment upon constitutionally protected rights. It details how the administrative enforcement process, by imposing costs upon the
defendant, discourages free speech.
Part IV proposes several changes in HUD's administrative procedures that will implement the amended Act in a
way that allows both respect for the exercise of constitutionally protected activities, and vigorous enforcement of the fair
housing laws.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

FairHousing Enforcement Before the 1988 Amendments

In 1968, on the heels of other sweeping civil rights legislation2 5 and in the midst of domestic upheaval,2 6 Congress
passed the Fair Housing Act of 1968.27 The Act was designed
to prevent racial segregation in housing and provided several
mechanisms to achieve that goal.2 8 The Act provided for: (1)
administrative proceedings within HUD; (2) administrative
proceedings by a state or local agency; (3) civil actions filed by
an aggrieved party in United States district court; and (4)
24. The term "Noerr-Penningtondoctrine" refers to a pair of Supreme Court
cases wherein the Court fashioned a way to make the important public policy
goals of the Sherman Antitrust Act not conflict with the First Amendment. See

Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1993)); Civil Rights Act of
1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971-1974e (1993)).
26. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF MAR.
1, 1968 1-10 (1968).

27. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-901, 82 Stat. 81
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).

28. The 1968 Fair Housing Act prohibited discrimination based upon race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in connection with the sale or rental of
residential housing. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82
Stat. 81, 83 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)). It extended to housing owned or operated by the federal government,
dwellings supported in whole or in part with federal loans, advances or grants,
and residences purchased or rented with federal funds. Id. § 803(2)(1).
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civil enforcement in pattern and practice actions by the Attorney General of the United States.2 9
1. Administrative Proceedings
The aggrieved person 30 suffering a discriminatory housing practice 3 1 was entitled to file a complaint with the Secretary of HUD.32 The alleged victim had to file the complaint
within 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination. 3
Upon receipt of the complaint, the Secretary was compelled to
conduct an investigation and attempt to resolve the dispute
informally through conciliation, conferences, and persuasion. 34 The Secretary had fairly broad power to investigate
complaints, including subpoenaing witnesses and submitting
interrogatories.35
Under the 1968 legislation, state and local agencies were
charged with much of the enforcement effort. 6 If state law
provided substantially equivalent rights and remedies as federal law, HUD was required to refer all complaints of housing
discrimination to the state or local agency. 37 Once the complaint was referred, HUD was not allowed to take further action unless the Secretary determined that the state or local
agency was not protecting the rights of the parties.38
29. Id. § 810(c). See also infra text accompanying note 48.
30. Courts have given the statutory definition of "aggrieved person" broad
interpretation. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 9697 (1979); Trafflcante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)
(holding that standing under the Fair Housing Act should be as broad as is
consistent with Article III); see also Housing Auth. v. City of Ponca City, 952
F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that Congress intended that the definition of
a "person" should be liberally defined to effectuate an important policy).
31. Any discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
handicap, or national origin in the sale, rental, advertising, or refusal to make
reasonable modifications in the residential real estate market is prohibited by
the Act, e.g., the refusal to rent an apartment because of the prospective
renter's race. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
32. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(a), 82 Stat. 81
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
33. Id. § 810(b).
34. Id. § 810(a).
35. Id. § 811(a).
36. See id. § 810(c) (directing that HUD refer all complaints of housing discrimination to state and local agencies if state laws provided remedies that
were substantively equivalent to those in the federal statute).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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If the Secretary was not able to convince the parties to
reconcile within thirty days, the aggrieved party was entitled
to file a lawsuit in United States district court.3 9 Under the
provisions of the 1968 legislation, HUD could attempt to informally mediate the dispute and provide the parties with information regarding their respective rights and responsibilities under the Act.40 Without providing HUD a more active
role in enforcement, the original law relied upon private litigation as the primary enforcement mechanism. 4 1
2. Private Litigation in District Court
The 1968 Act gave an aggrieved person essentially two
choices if he or she wanted to pursue private litigation. The
aggrieved party could bypass HUD's administrative process
altogether and file an action in United States district court
directly.4 2 Alternatively, the person could take the more
circuitous route and file an administrative complaint with
HUD, or a corresponding state or local agency, and then file a
lawsuit in district court if the administrative process was not
satisfactory.4 3
If the aggrieved person filed an administrative complaint, the district court was required to delay the proceeding
if conciliation efforts were likely to succeed.4 4 The statute
also gave the court the power to appoint attorneys and com39. Id. § 810(d).
40. The original bill introduced by then Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn.)
gave HUD significant enforcement power. H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). The bill provided for conciliation. Id. If conciliation failed, the Secretary could independently issue a complaint, hold hearings, and enforce orders
upon a finding of discrimination. Id. These provisions prompted serious criticism concerning potential infringement upon constitutional rights. See 114
CONG. REC. 2984-94 (1968). In an effort to save the bill, Senator Everett Dirksen (R-ll.) offered an amendment that removed the offending enforcement provisions. Id. at 4570-78.
41. Many critics of the original law saw this as the primary weakness of the
original legislation. See James A. Kushner, Symposium: The State of the
Union: Civil Rights: The FairHousing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049 (1989); Minna J. Kotkin,
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: New Strategies for New Procedures, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 755 (1989-1990); Leland B. Ware, New
Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Provisions of the 1988 Amendments to the FairHousing Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 59 (1993).
42. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812, 82 Stat. 81, 88
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
43. Id. § 810.
44. Id. § 812(a).
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mence actions without payment of costs upon a showing of
financial need. 45 Despite the generous provisions, which allowed needy plaintiffs to commence and prosecute an action,
the statute only provided limited relief if the aggrieved person prevailed. An adjudicatory body finding discrimination
was limited to providing injunctive relief, actual damages,
and not more than $1000 in punitive damages. 46 Additionally, the court could provide attorney fees and costs if the
plaintiff was not able to pay.47
In unique circumstances, the Attorney General was authorized to initiate enforcement actions.4 8 However, for the
most part, the protection and preservation of fair housing
rights was the domain of the injured party.4 9 In the years
following the legislation's enactment, private actions developed a significant body of precedent that expanded and defined the statute's potential for combating various forms of
housing discrimination. 50 Nevertheless, fair housing advocates became increasingly disenchanted with the barriers imposed by the lack of any meaningful enforcement authority at
limitations on the relief available to
HUD, and the severe
51
plaintiffs.
prevailing
Advocates of stronger enforcement were frustrated with
the current scheme. 5 2 They articulated their frustration to
Congress, which in turn repeatedly attempted to strengthen
the administrative enforcement abilities of HUD. 53 Congres45. Id. § 812(b).
46. Id. § 812(c).
47. Id. § 810(c).
48. See id. § 813. The Attorney General was authorized to file civil actions
in cases of pattern or practice discrimination and in cases where issues of general public importance were raised. See id. Pattern and practice is defined as a
discriminatory practice that affects groups of people rather than just one individual. F. Willis Caruso & William H. Jones, FairHousing in the 1990's: An
Overview of Recent Developments and Prognosis of Their Impact, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 421, 524-25 (1989).
49. Immediately after the enactment of the 1968 legislation, the Department of Justice established a section within the Civil Rights Division that was
in charge of enforcing the Act. Caruso & Jones, supra note 48, at 429. However, over a twelve-year period, only 300 suits were filed. JAMES KuSHNER, FAIR
HoUSING § 10.01 n.2 (1984).
50. See generally Kushner, supra note 41, at 1070-80.
51. Ware, supra note 41, at 79.
52. See supra note 42.
53. Almost every year since 1977, Congress attempted to strengthen the
enforcement procedures of the Fair Housing Act by establishing a significant
federal enforcement mechanism. Kushner, supra note 41, at 1086.
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sional efforts resulted in passage of the amended Act, which
significantly enhanced the enforcement mechanisms, dramatically increased HUD's role in the entire process, and expanded the protected categories to include the handicapped
and families with children.5 4
B.

FairHousing Amendments Act of 1988

The new enforcement mechanisms of the amended Act
55
gave HUD a powerful new tool to combat discrimination.
Former critics heralded the new procedures and were ecstatic
because "[a]fter twenty years with almost no enforcement authority, HUD now [had] what is likely the most comprehensive civil enforcement mechanism of any of the various fed56
eral agencies."
1. New Administrative Enforcement Provisions
The most important changes to the law came in terms of
57
the administrative enforcement powers given to HUD.
Both the old and amended Acts allow the aggrieved party to
file a complaint with HUD alleging discrimination. 58 However, under the old Act, HUD could only attempt voluntary
conciliation.5 9 If that failed, or if the respondent failed to participate, HUD could only inform the aggrieved party of his or
her right to initiate private action. 0
The amended Act provides the alleged victim with a powerful ally. Now, upon receipt of a complaint, the Secretary,
utilizing the comparatively inexhaustible resources available
to HUD, 6 1 becomes the alleged victim's proxy in prosecuting
54.
55.
56.
57.

Ware, supra note 41, at 80.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id.

58. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.

59. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810, 82 Stat. 81, 85-86
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
60. Id.
61. HUD's resources are only limited by its appropriations from the federal
government and its internal decisions on how to utilize those resources. HUD's
resources are considerable, and are certainly considered "inexhaustible" compared to those of an average wage earner. HUD's budget for fiscal 1988 was
$29,193,000. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 808(E)(2) OF THE FAIR HOUSING

ACT (1989).
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the complaint.6 2 Once an aggrieved person6 3 suffers discrimination, or a third party 64 believes that such person will suffer
65
discrimination, a complaint can be lodged with HUD.
The amended Act also allows complaints to be based
6 6 The
upon claims of interference, coercion, or intimidation.
Act not only protects the person who is seeking the benefits of
fair housing, but it also protects anyone who aided or en6 7 Coercion, intercouraged such person to seek fair housing.
ference, and intimidation have traditionally only encom8 However,
passed overt acts designed to further exclusion.
that interpretation is evolving and expanding under the current administration.6 9
The present interpretation is similar to the tort of intentional interference with economic advantage. Briefly, the elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage are: (1) an existing economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party that will economically benefit the plaintiff in the future; (2) the defendant's
knowledge of this relationship; (3) the defendant's intentional
62. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
63. The Act of 1988 expands the definition to anyone claiming to be injured
by housing discrimination, and any other third party who believes that such
person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. See id. § 3602(i).
64. A "third party" can literally be anyone. The only statutory requirement
is that the third party either (1) witnesses the housing discrimination, or (2)
believes that housing discrimination will occur in the future. The third party
subset includes anyone from an interested housing developer, or housing advocate, to an ordinary person of good will. Id.
65. Id. § 3610(a).
66. Id. § 3618.
67. Id.
68. See South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater South-Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusal of Board of Realtors to allow multiple
listing for homes being offered through nonprofit corporation intended to encourage whites to integrate neighborhood does not violate coercion section of
the act); Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (firebombing a
house to intimidate and force the occupants to move violates the act); Delano
Village Co. v. Orridge, 553 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (attempting to coerce
property owners into selling to only a particular racial group violates act).
69. FairHousing Issues, supra note 4. The current administration seems
comfortable with a rather broad interpretation of interference. Id. The application of such a broad standard led to considerable outcry when it was applied to
a peaceful protest of city housing plans and zoning decisions. See supra note 21.
The subsequent HUD investigation of the protest, on the grounds that it was a
violation of the Fair Housing Act, led to allegations that HUD was infringing on
First Amendment rights of free speech. See MacDonald, supra note 22, at B13.
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and successful disruption of this relationship; and (4) damage
proximately caused by the actions of the defendant.7 °
HUD deviated from the conventional interpretation of interference as it was used in the fair housing context. 7 1 Formerly, the interpretation was an amalgam of coercion, interference, and intimidation that usually had a physical
element.7 2 Under the old Act, HUD remained true to the
spirit of the legislation which envisioned interference as a
physical act that prohibited a person from exercising constitutional rights.73
HUD shifted its interpretation, allowing claims to be
made based upon speech alone, not in conjunction with any
physical element. 74 By switching from the old interpretation
to one that closely resembles economic interference, and by
focusing upon the communicative aspect of interference,
HUD significantly expanded the range of conduct prohibited
by the Act.
Upon receipt of a complaint, HUD is required to initiate
a thorough investigation of all the facts surrounding the complaint.7 5 The amended Act now authorizes HUD to be an independent actor. HUD is no longer required to passively re76
ceive complaints; rather, the agency can initiate them itself.
No longer is HUD required to stand by and watch the action;
it is now a full fledged participant.77
Additionally, HUD or an individual now has up to a full
year to file a complaint, as opposed to 180 days under the old
70. John C. Barker, Common Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problemof

SLAPPS, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 395, 420 (1993) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 129-30 (5th ed. 1984)).

ET AL.,

71. See supra note 68.

72. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3618 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
73. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 811, 82 Stat. 81, 87
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see
also 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat.) 195.
74. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
75. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
76. Id. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i).
77. Id. § 3610(f). Under the amended Act, HUD can still refer the complaint to a state or local government agency if that agency's program has been
certified by HUD. Id. HUD is only required to refer complaints to the agencies
it has certified and HUD can step in if the agency does not prosecute the action
quickly and to the satisfaction of HUD. Id.
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Act.7" During the 100 days that HUD has to complete its investigation, it has extraordinary power. 79 It can issue subpoenas, compel witnesses to testify, issue interrogatories, request the turnover of documents, inspect property, and
compel physical or mental examinations.8 0 HUD can use all
the tools of discovery that would be available to any party in
a civil action in the district where the action was filed.8 "
Under the old Act, the breadth of HUD's discovery was
limited. Although HUD could issue subpoenas or interrogatories, it did not have the power to independently enforce
those requests.8 2 If the respondent resisted HUD's discovery
efforts, HUD had to go to district court to seek enforcement. 8
The additional procedural step of having to go to district
court and justify discovery requests increased the cost of discovery and limited its attractiveness as a litigation tactic.
Additionally, the lack of significant statutory penalties for
failure to comply with discovery requests limited the leverage
that could be gained by hanging stiff penalties over the heads
of recalcitrant respondents.8 4
The amended Act significantly enhances HUD's ability to
conduct discovery. Willful failure to comply with HUD's requests during the investigation results in stiff civil and criminal penalties.8 5 Attempts to mislead through false statements, destruction of documents, or making less than full,
true, and correct entries in reports or records can result in
fines of $100,000 and imprisonment of up to one year, or
86
both.
78. Id. § 3610.
79. Id.
80. HUD had these same powers under the old Act. However, it could not
independently enforce the subpoenas, rather it had to go to the United States
district court to seek enforcement. Additionally, the civil fines under the old
Act were limited to $1000, whereas under the amended Act the maximum penalty is $100,000. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 811, 82 Stat.
81, 87 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
81. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3611 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). See also 24 C.F.R. § 104.00 (1994).
82. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 811(e), 82 Stat. 81, 87
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 18.
85. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3611(c) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
86. Id.
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Commentators have generally applauded the new, stringent enforcement mechanisms, especially because they relieve potential victims of the burden of prosecuting their own
actions.8 7 However, there has been scant notice of the potential for abuse. Any person legitimately concerned enough
about housing development, and who plans to speak out on
the issue, runs the risk of a HUD investigation. 8
At the conclusion of an investigation, HUD determines if
there is reasonable cause to believe that housing discrimination occurred or is about to occur. 9 If the Secretary finds reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred, HUD
will issue a charge on behalf of the aggrieved person. 90
At this juncture, either a complainant, respondent, or an
aggrieved person on whose behalf the complaint was filed can
elect 91 to have the dispute heard in United States district
court.9 2 If that election is made, the Attorney General will
commence and maintain an action on behalf of the aggrieved
person in district court. 9 3 This provision relieves the aggrieved person from having to contribute to the prosecution of
the claim, regardless of the person's actual ability or inability
94
to pay.
87. Ware, supra note 41, at 75-77.
88. Id. at 75. The amended Act's procedures are without precedent and
they are as of yet untested by experience and judicial construction. Id.
89. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Prior to 1990, the Office of General Counsel to the Assistant
Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity would make cause determinations. In 1990 that task was delegated to the individual attorneys in each of
the regional offices. After the issuance of new guidelines in 1994, any cause
determinations relating to certain aspects of the First Amendment are once
again referred to the Assistant Secretary's Office of General Counsel. See Letter from Henry Cisneros, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, to Robert F. Hoyt, Esq., of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, on behalf of
American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities (Nov. 3, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Letter to Robert F. Hoyt].
90. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
91. This provision was inserted to protect the legislation from challenges
based upon the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial. See Craig Sloan,
Constitutional Challenges to Section 812 of the FairHousing Act, 79 Ky. L.J.
585 (1991).
92. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
93. Id. § 3612(o)(1).
94. The aggrieved party can intervene as a matter of right in HUD's case.
Id. § 3612.
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If the election is not made, then the dispute will be heard
before an administrative law judge.95 The administrative
law judge will hold a hearing where the parties may be represented by counsel, introduce evidence, 96 and examine and
cross-examine witnesses.97 Essentially, the proceeding
before the administrative law judge is a full civil trial.9"
Once again, discovery may be conducted as if the hearing was
a civil trial in the district court where the action was filed.99
As in the preliminary investigation, HUD represents and assumes the costs of representation for the aggrieved person. 100
2. Damages Under the Amended Act
If the administrative law judge finds that the aggrieved
person suffered unlawful discrimination, he or she is authorized to award compensatory damages, injunctive and other
equitable relief, 10 and fines of up to $10,000 for the first offense, $25,000 for the second, and $50,000 for the third.'0 2 If
the discrimination occurred in the course of a business that is
subject to a governmental licensing agency, HUD is required
law to that agency
to send a copy of the findings of fact0 and
3
and recommend disciplinary action.'
If the election is made to have the dispute heard in U.S.
district court, and the case proceeds as a civil action, the aggrieved person is entitled to punitive damages, even after
HUD litigates the action. 10 4 Although not entitled to have

HUD representation, an aggrieved person can bring a civil
95. Id. § 3612(b).
96. The Federal Rules of Evidence govern rules of testimony and documentary evidence. Id. § 3612(d).
97. 24 C.F.R. § 104 (1992).
98. Id.
99. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(d) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).

100. Id. § 3612.
101. Id. § 3610(d). Injunctive relief under this section is fairly broad. As
long as the remedy furthers the twin goals of insuring that the Act is not violated in the future and that it removes any lingering effects of past discrimination, the court's discretion will not be questioned. Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 1983).
102. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
103. Id. § 3612(g)(5).
104. Id. § 3612(o)(3).
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suit independently and will have counsel provided if he or she
10 5
is not able to pay.
Regardless of whether the case proceeds as a civil or administrative action, the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. 10 6 If the aggrieved person does
not prevail, HUD will still be responsible for all costs, regard10 7
less of the relative merit of the initial complaint.
The Secretary is authorized to review any findings issued
by the administrative law judge.'0° However, that review is
discretionary, and the statute states that review will only occur in extraordinary circumstances. 10 9 Unsatisfied parties
can bring their request for review to the United States court
of appeals for the circuit in which the action occurred.110
C.

HUD's Application of the Amended Act

In 1989, 7174 fair housing complaints were filed. 1 1
HUD had jurisdiction in 3952 cases, while the remaining
cases fell under state and local jurisdictions." 2 Three times
as many complaints were filed with HUD in 1989 as the previous year, while state and local agencies did not experience
an appreciable increase." 3 Ninety-five percent of all complaints filed in 1989 were filed after the amended Act became
effective. 1 4 During 1989, HUD reported an extraordinary increase in the number of conciliations. A total of 862 cases
were successfully conciliated, representing a 420% increase
in the number of conciliations over the previous year. 115
Despite a significant increase in the number of complaints filed with HUD, only a small number of cases were
submitted to the Office of General Counsel to the Assistant
17
Secretary for Fair Housing" 6 for determination of cause.1
105. Id. § 3613.
106. Id. § 3612(p).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 3612(h)(1).
109. Id. § 3614.
110. Id. § 3612(j)(1).
111. Ware, supra note 41, at 100.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 101.
116. Prior to 1990, the Office of General Counsel would make "no cause" determinations. That is, after reviewing all the factual data acquired in the preliminary investigation, a determination would be made whether the facts sup-
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Ninety-one cases were submitted to the General Counsel, and
in only nineteen cases did the Counsel determine that there
was reasonable cause to believe that there was a violation of
the Act." 8
HUD's volume of complaints increased slightly in 1990.
A total of 7675 complaints were filed, of which HUD handled
4457.119 Of the 1740 complaints HUD resolved, 1709 were

resolved through conciliation. 120 Interestingly, 769 cases
were referred for cause determinations, and only eighty were
to believe that there had
determined to have cause sufficient
12 1
been a violation of the Act.

In 1990, the task of cause determination was delegated
from the General Counsel to the Assistant Secretary for Fair
Housing.' 2 2 In 1991, the authority to make cause determina23
tions was delegated to the ten regional HUD offices.'
Although the delegation only involved claims based upon
race, sex, or national origin,' 24 it nonetheless demonstrated
that HUD was comfortable with this crucial determination
being made at a relatively low level.
1. FirstAmendment Conflict with the Act's
Administration
Late in 1993 and 1994, several stories from the wire
services sensationally detailed alleged abuses of private citizens' First Amendment rights by HUD25 while HUD was attempting to enforce the amended Act.'
ported a charge of housing discrimination. In 1990, that duty was delegated
from the Office of General Counsel to the regional attorneys in each of the regional offices. Id. at 103 (citing an interview with Harry L. Carey, Assistant
General Counsel for Fair Housing, Office of the General Counsel, HUD, in
Washington, D.C. (June 11, 1991)).
117. Id. at 100 (quoting DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR
HOUSING: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 808(E)(2) OF THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT (1989)).

118. Id. at 102.
119. Id. at 100 (quoting DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 1990 COMPLAINT
PROCESSING DATA 1 (Apr. 25, 1991)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 107.
122. Id. at 103.
123. Id. at 104.
124. Id. (citing an interview with Harry L. Carey, Assistant General Counsel
for Fair Housing, Office of the General Counsel, HUD, in Washington, D.C.
(June 11, 1991)).
125. See supra note 22.
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Public outcry forced HUD to issue new guidelines. 1 26
These guidelines were purportedly designed to protect the
First Amendment rights of the possible subjects of HUD investigations. 127 The guidelines 128 state that "absent force,
physical harm or threat of either, HUD will not accept for filing or investigate any complaint based on public activities
that are directed toward achieving action by a governmental
activity."1 29 Examples of protected public activities include
distributing flyers, holding community meetings, writing articles in the newspaper, peaceful demonstrations, testifying
at public hearings, and communicating directly with a gov0
ernmental entity concerning official governmental activity. 13
HUD's perfunctory recitation of its respect for First
Amendment freedoms, however, is tempered by the number
13 1
of exceptions to its new guidelines.
2.

HUD's Version of the SLAPP Suit

SLAPP is an acronym that stands for "strategic lawsuits
against public participation." 3 2 SLAPPs are civil lawsuits
designed to prevent citizens from exercising their political
rights, or punish those who have done so.' 33 Essentially, they
are punitive lawsuits which punish activists for exercising
their constitutional right to speak and petition the government for redress of grievances.13 4 Although traditionally
used by private interests like developers to discourage environmental activism, 35 HUD's procedures for resolving fair
126. See Letter to Robert F. Hoyt, supra note 89, at 1.
127. See id.
128. These are not formal rules and can be revised or repealed by the issuing
agency without notice or comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 533(c) (1988).
129. Letter to Robert F. Hoyt, supra note 89, at 2.
130. Memorandum from Roberta Achtenburg, Assistant Secretary for Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity, HUD, to FEHO Office Directors (Sept. 2,
1994) (on file with author).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. George Canan & Penelope A. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation,35 Soc. PROBS. 506, 506 (1988).
134. Thomas A. Waldman, SLAPP Suits: Weakness in First Amendment
Law and in the Courts'Responsesto FrivolousLitigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979,
981-82 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
135. See Note, Counterclaim and Countersuit and Harassmentof Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications and Proposed Solutions, 74
MICH.

L.

REV.

106, 107 (1975).
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housing complaints bear a striking and frightening resemblance to SLAPPs as they have evolved in other areas.
Typically, an environmental activist petitions the government to stop some form of development.136 Petitioning
usually involves some form of political activity such as circulating a petition, writing a letter to the editor, testifying at a
public hearing, filing a public interest lawsuit, or communi1 37
cating views attempting to influence government action.
Hoping to exploit its tremendous relative advantage in terms
of resources to prosecute the litigation, the developer then
sues the activist to discourage further action, divert the activist's scarce resources, and subsequently stifle political
protest.

38

Legal scholars have identified several characteristics of
SLAPPs.1 39 One of the most frequently alleged claims is interference. 40 The second most common characteristic is the
request for large damage awards in comparison with the resources of the defendant.' 4 ' The plaintiff will usually try to
get an injunction against the defendant. 42 Additionally, defendants will usually sustain considerable legal expenses
even if the action is eventually dropped, or if the defendant
prevails on the merits.1 43 Finally, most SLAPPs are frivolous. 1 4 4

In the majority of cases, the defendant wins a

favorable legal judgment. ' 45 Therefore, the primary threat to
is the cost and strain involved in defending the
the defendant
46
lawsuit.

1

136. Id.
137. George Canan & Penelope A. Pring, SLAPPS: Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participationin Government, C935 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 4 (1994).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Interference in this context refers to the tort of interference with economic advantage. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS §§ 129-130 (5th ed. 1984).
141. See Canan & Pring, supra note 133, at 512.
142. Id.
143. See George Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 26 (1992) (detailing the financial burdens on a SLAPP
defendant).
144. Waldman, supra note 134, at 984.
145. Canan and Pring found that defendants won favorable legal judgment
in 83% of the cases they had studied. Id. at 981-82 (citing Canan & Pring,
supra note 133, at 515).
146. Canan & Pring, supra note 133, at 514.
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The controversy over the use of SLAPPs is the result of a
conflict of values. As a society, we want to provide injured
parties with a convenient, nonviolent forum in which they
can air their grievances and potentially be made whole. That
forum should be accessible so as to increase its use as a
method of resolving disputes. Consequently, we have established rules making the courts as accessible as possible. 147
Ease of access, however, should not encourage frivolous
charges. Therefore, persons bringing frivolous actions can be
sanctioned. 148 The difficulty is that the time lag between the
complaint and the determination that the action is without
merit can still result in enormous legal expenses. Of course,
that assumes the successful determination of what constitutes a frivolous suit; the line between a frivolous and non149
frivolous claim is not always distinct.
3.

Statutory Attempts to Protect Individuals Against
SLAPPs

In the early 1990s, several states attempted to pass legislation making the prosecution of SLAPPs more difficult.1 50
The proposed laws attacked the proliferation of SLAPPs on
two fronts. First, they raised the level of pleading required
147. Pleading rules require only a short, plain statement showing the
pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
148. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
the signer that the signer has read the pleading ... ; that to the best of
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation ....
If a pleading is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the pleading ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
149. One potential defense to frivolous actions is a countersuit for malicious
prosecution. However, there are many drawbacks to fighting frivolous actions
this way, namely, the necessity of resolving the first action before filing the
malicious prosecution action, high evidentiary hurdles and the necessity of incurring more legal expenses to prosecute the second action. See, e.g., Babb v.
Superior Court, 479 P.2d 379 (Cal. 1971).
150. See, e.g., S.B. 2313, 1989-1990 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; A.B. 440, 19911992 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; NYCRR §§ 130-1.1 (1994).
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for quick dismissals of SLAPPs. 15 1 Second, they either increased penalties for frivolous filings or, in appropriate circumstances, provided attorney's fees to the prevailing defendants. 15 2 Although the early California laws were vetoed by
then Governor Deukmejian, 15 3 the procedures in the legislation15 4 provided models to build on, and they also illustrated
the courts' failure to develop a coherent doctrine to protect
the right to petition the government and prevent SLAPPs.155
Early attempts by reformers in California at introducing
anti-SLAPP legislation were unsuccessful. 56 However, their
diligence was rewarded in 1992, when Governor Wilson
signed into law essentially the same law that had been first
151. Id. The statutes raise the pleading level by providing defendants with a
special motion to strike. Id. The special motion considers the likelihood of the
case succeeding on the merits, if the pleading is not specific enough to support a
reasonable belief that the case will succeed on the merits, it will be dismissed.
Id.
152. See S.B. 2313, 1989-1990 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; A.B. 440, 1991-1992 Cal.
Leg., Reg. Sess.
153. The legislature attempted to pass S.B. 2313, 1989-1990 Cal. Leg., Reg.
Sess., but it was vetoed by Governor Deukmejian. See A.B. 440, 1991-1992 Cal.
Leg., Reg. Sess. Another attempt to pass the legislation was vetoed by Governor Wilson. Id.
154. The following are pertinent parts of the proposed legislation:
Section 1. Section 425.16 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, to
read:
425.16(a) No cause of action against a person arising from any act
of the person in furtherance of his or her first amendment right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue, shall be included
in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing the pleading after the court determines that the party seeking
to file the pleading has established that there is a substantial
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. The court may
allow the filing of a pleading that includes that claim following the filing of a verified petition therefore accompanied by the proposed pleading and supporting affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability
is based. The court shall order service of the petition upon the party
against whom the action is proposed to be filed and permit that party
to submit opposing affidavits prior to making its determination.
If the court determines that the plaintiff has established substantial probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that
determination not the fact of that determination shall be admissible in
evidence at any later stage of the case ....
(b) In any action subject to subdivision (a), a prevailing defendant
shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.
S.B. 2313, 1989-1990 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.
155. See Waldman, supra note 134, at 1038-39.
156. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
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proposed in 1989.157 The most important change was the pro-

vision for more stringent pleading.'" 8 The legislature was attempting to balance plaintiffs' rights to have access to the
courts, with defendants' rights to not have to mount expensive defenses when exercising First Amendment rights. 159
layer of procedure between the
The change created another
160
plaintiff and the court.
California had already experimented with increased
pleading requirements prior to introducing legislation to curb
the abuse of SLAPPs. 16 1 Punitive damage claims for medical
malpractice, 162 punitive damage claims against religious organizations,163 and claims against directors of nonprofit cor1 65
porations 1 6 4 all possess heightened pleading requirements.

The anti-SLAPP statute 166 and the other heightened
pleading statutes restrict particular causes of action under
particular circumstances. 167 However, the statutes appear to
require different levels of specificity in pleading.168 The nonprofit provision requires that a plaintiff prove that there is
evidence "that substantiates the claim."' 6 9 The anti-SLAPP

"probability that the plaintiff will prevail
provision requires
70
on the claim."

On the surface, the two statutes certainly demand that
different evidentiary standards be met before the plaintiff
satisfies the pleading conditions. However, the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute did not find
this distinction meaningful.' 7 1 The court found that although
the legislature used different phraseology, the general intent
157. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1994) (added by 1992 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 726 (S.B. 1264) and amended by 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1239 (S.B.
9)).
158. See supra note 151.
159. See supra note 152.
160. See Waldman, supra note 134, at 1038.
161. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
162. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.13 (West Supp. 1994) (adopted in 1987).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
166. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1994).
167. See College Hosp. Inc. v. Superior Court, 882 P.2d 894, 902 (Cal. 1994).
168. See infra text accompanying notes 169-70.
169. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.15(a) (West Supp. 1994).
170. Id. § 425.16(b).
171. College Hosp. Inc., 882 P.2d at 901.

1996]

WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY

1117

procedural burden in debehind the statutes was to shift the
1 72
termining the merit of an action.

The court stated that because the language of the statutes created an ambiguous standard, it would use the legislative intent and a common sense reading of the language to
determine its meaning. 1 73 The court's research into the legislative intent revealed that the purpose of the provision was to
provide procedural protection against frivolous claims, while
allowing legitimate claims. 174 The common sense interpretation was that the statute did not require the court to weigh
the relative merits of a claim in determining its potential outoperated like a
come at trial. 175 Rather, the statute simply
" 76
summary judgment motion in "reverse.

1

The statute did not force the court to weigh the relative
merits of the competing claims. The statute's main function
was to shift the burden of proof in an initial challenge to the
action's validity. 77 Rather than requiring the defendant to
defeat the plaintiff's pleading by showing that it was legally
or factually meritless, the statute required the plaintiff to
which
demonstrate that there was a legally sufficient claim
178
evidence.
admissible
competent,
by
supported
was
D. Primacy of the FirstAmendment
Legislative efforts to stem the proliferation of frivolous
lawsuits are motivated by a desire to protect an individual's
ability to exercise constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and petition for the redress of grievances. 79 Finding that it
is in the public interest to encourage participation in matters
of public significance, the legislature sought to protect the
valid exercise of constitutional rights from the chilling effects
of costly and destructive litigation.8 0 This legislative movement to solve abusive litigation's corrosive effects on public
172. Id. at 902.
173. Id. at 901.
174. Id. at 902 (quoting Letter from John T. Doolitle, Senate Committee
Chair, Senate Bill No. 1, 1987-1988 Reg. Sess., to Governor George Deukmajian
(Jan. 26, 1988)).
175. Id.
176. College Hosp. Inc., 882 P.2d at 903.
177. Id. at 902.
178. Id. at 903.
179. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 1994).
180. Id.
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discourse, reflects 8the
current belief in the primacy of the
1
First Amendment.1
1.

Early Applications of the FirstAmendment

The First Amendment did not always enjoy such popular
support, either in the judiciary or the legislature. In its early
application, the First Amendment did not prevent a loyalty
oath for lawyers, 8 2 interfere with the federal government's
prohibition on the distribution of off-color books or information about abortion,18 3 create a general right of assembly, 8 4
or protect a political activist from receiving a substantial
prison sentence for political speech. 8 5
Additionally, the First Amendment did not apply to the
states until 1925, when the United States Supreme Court
stated that, "[for present purposes we may and do assume
that freedom of speech.. . - which [is] protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress - [is] among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." 8 6
The right to petition the government had only been recognized in one isolated instance 1 8 7 prior to the turn of the
century, and it had never been applied by the Supreme
Court.18 8 Given the overall conception of the First Amendment at the time, even if the Supreme Court had upheld the
right to petition, it most likely would have held that any right
to engage in political speech would be construed as forbidding
8 9
only prior restraints, not subsequent punishment.1
The Court's interpretation of the First Amendment
changed radically after 1930. Louis Brandeis became a member of the Court, bringing a more sensitive perspective to the
181. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1699, 1736-37 (1991).
182. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867).
183. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
184. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
185. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
186. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
187. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
188. Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundationsof Noerr-Penningtonand the Burden of Proving Sham Petitioning: The Historical-ConstitutionalArgument in
Favor of a "Clearand Convincing"Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 681, 704 (1994)
(citing Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882)).
189. Id. (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
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issue of individual liberty. 19 0 Justice Holmes capitulated, departed from the substantive due process camp, and adopted a
more congenial attitude toward speech issues. 19 1 The First
Amendment was applied to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment, 192 and there was a fundamental shift in the jurisprudence caused by the New Deal. 193 This combination of
factors led to the complete 4reversal in the Court's application
9
of the First Amendment.1
A complete examination of First Amendment jurisprudence from the turn of the century to the present is beyond
the scope of this comment. However, suffice it to say that the
rise of the First Amendment directly coincided with the decline of property and economic liberty interests that was the
hallmark of the era of substantive due process.1 9'
Scholars have noted that the rise of free speech was in
part a reaction to the erosion of the laissez faire stance of the
Lochner' 96 era Court. 1 9 7 Fearing a misallocation of political
resources in favor of an interventionist government, the
Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence prohibited the government from interfering with citizens' political rights. 198 The
creation of the regulatory state, inherent in much of the New
Deal legislation, gave the states power that required an attendant check upon their exercise to prevent abuse.' 99 Consequently, First Amendment jurisprudence prohibited the
government from countering public attempts to enforce gov20 0
ernment accountability.
2.

BalancingRegulatory Goals with FirstAmendment
Rights

The decline of economic rights, the rise of the regulatory
state, and the subsequent ascendancy of First Amendment
190. Id. at 707 (quoting Howard 0. Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles:
The FirstAmendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59,
99 (1986)).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 704.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
197. Yassky, supra note 181, at 1736.
198. Id. at 1736-37.
199. Faulkner, supra note 188, at 704.
200. Id.
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freedoms reflect a precarious balancing of individual and institutional power. The regulatory state attempts to achieve
collective goals by controlling certain aspects of individual behavior. The shift in First Amendment jurisprudence chronicles the belief that if the individual surrenders liberty in order to facilitate collective goals, there should be a concurrent
increase in the ability to inform the government as to the content and implementation of those rules.
The Court, shifting from outcome-based jurisprudence in
the Lochner era to process-based jurisprudence, occasionally
had difficulty in maintaining the primacy of the First Amendment in the face of challenges from the regulatory state.2 °1
One of the first important governmental goals was the prevention of unfair economic competition that resulted from the
creation of monopolies. 20 2 The Sherman Antitrust Act 20 3 de-

clared that "[e]very contract, combination in form of a trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal." 20 4 The Act likewise made any attempt to com-

bine or to monopolize trade with another person a felony.20 5
Predictably, the Court soon encountered cases where an
individual's actions would be prohibited by the Sherman An20 7
titrust Act 206 and yet protected by the First Amendment.
The clash of conflicting values forced the Court to fashion an
interpretation of the statute that did not impinge upon the
primacy of the First Amendment.
3. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
At issue in EasternRailroadPresidentsConference v. Noerr Motor Freight20 was an illegal railroad industry publicity
campaign designed to influence public policies that would be
harmful to the trucking industry.20 9 The campaign was
aimed at securing the passage of state legislation that would
201. See supra note 26; see also infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
202. See William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law:
1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 226 (1956).
203. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

204. Id. § 1.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 129.
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maintain the railroad's hegemony in the freight hauling industry. 2 10 The campaign was deceptive because the railroads
used a third party to implement the campaign, thereby making it appear as though their views were the spontaneously
expressed views of the general public.2 1 '
The trial court rejected the railroads' constitutional arguments and found that they had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.21 2 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
holding.21 3 The dissenting judge noted that he "had not hitherto imagined that a constitutional guarantee could be
avoided because of the bad conduct of the individual asserting
the constitutional right."21 4 Additionally, he asserted that
constraining an individual's ability to petition the government to protect economic interests was a threat to the very
foundations of republican government.2 15 He concluded by
saying that he could not conceive that Congress intended to
make the Sherman Act a barrier to an individual's exercise of
First Amendment rights.21 6
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, stating
that at least insofar as the railroads' activities were merely
designed to solicit governmental action, they could not have
been in violation of the Sherman Act."1 7 The Court equivocated and did not declare that any attempts to influence legislation would be constitutional. Rather, it stated that in this
210. Id. at 128-30.
211. Id. at 130.
212. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F.
Supp. 768, 827-28 (E.D. Pa. 1957), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The trial court
held that: (1) there was no prior restraint; (2) the speech used was only to apply
the greater resources of one group to accomplish an illegal objective; (3) the
illegal objective created an illegal conspiracy that was not protected by the First
Amendment; and (4) the First Amendment did not allow individuals to violate
valid laws designed to protect important and legitimate interests of society. See
id. at 812-31.
213. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273
F.2d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Chief Justice Biggs'
dissent was a harbinger of the Supreme Court's eventual holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act could not be interpreted as eradicating the constitutional
right to petition the government. Id. (Biggs, C.J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 227 (Biggs, C.J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 227-30 (Biggs, C.J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 228 (Biggs, C.J., dissenting).
217. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 137 (1961).
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instance, the railroads' actions were not typical of what the
Sherman Act prohibited.2 1
However, later in the opinion, the Court emphasized the
axiomatic role that the freedom of speech plays within the
context of representative democracy, stating, "[I]n a representative democracy . .. government act[s] on behalf of the
people and ...the whole concept of representati[ve government] depends upon the ability of the people to make their
wishes known to their representatives .... 219 The Court
then reiterated its interpretation of the proper balance between the goals of legitimate legislation and constitutional
rights, stating:
To hold that the government retains the power to act in
this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same
time, that the people cannot freely inform the government
of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activ... would raise impority ... [and] such a construction
2 20
tant constitutional questions.
The Court established that economic regulation did not usurp
the individual's ability to freely exercise constitutional rights.
4.

The Sham Exception

The Supreme Court protected the railroads' ability to petition the government, but it did not state categorically that
all activities under the aegis of petitioning were protected.2 2 1
Unspecified activity designed to petition the government
could be prohibited under the Sherman Act.2 2 2
Speaking for the Court, Justice Black said, "[T]here may
be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt
to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."2 2 3 The Court did not specify what activities would be
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 144.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144.
Id.
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prohibited, thereby introducing an ambiguous standard that
has defied definition.
The Court somewhat reduced the ambiguity surrounding
the "sham" exception when it decided California Motor
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited.224 There, the Court extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to all departments of
the government.2 25 The Court used a broad definition of government, which included all channels of state and federal
agencies and the courts.2 2 6
In clarifying the sham exception, the Court distinguished
between attempts to influence the actions of governmental
agencies, and monopolizing the avenues of redress to the
point where the agencies have been captured by the group.2 2 7
The Court focused upon the use of superior resources to overwhelm the channels of communication, thereby becoming the
de facto arbiter of rights and privileges. 228 Although ostensibly clarifying the sham exception, the Court merely used a
normative analysis that focused upon a standard that
counted the number of times an individual petitioned, motioned, or appealed to an agency, and arbitrarily drew a line
at the point of abuse.
However, the important point to emphasize for this discussion is that the Court once again reasserted the primacy of
the First Amendment when in conflict with a legitimate regulation to achieve an important social goal. Once again, the
Court found that unfettered speech is the foundation of representative democracy, and that to attempt to curb speech to
achieve another goal would only represent a Pyrrhic advance
in policy, because it would undermine the structure and process by which the goals are articulated.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Identification of the Problem
Ostensibly, an effective housing discrimination statute
should provide incentives that encourage a person to sue
every time he or she is discriminated against while seeking
224. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972).

225. Id. at 510.
226. Id.

227. Id. at 511.
228. Id. at 511-12.
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housing. In other words, the statute should provide a framework for a cost-benefit analysis that will always reward a
lawsuit against a person who discriminates.
However, the statute should not be so broad as to prohibit legitimate behavior. Consequently, an effective statute
will force a person engaging in discrimination to bear all the
costs that society, through the statute, has decided are sufficient to discourage discrimination, yet it will be narrowly tailored to impose costs only upon the unwanted behavior.
Under the old Act,22 9 when a person displayed unwanted
behavior, the statute gave the injured party a cause of action,
defined possible sanctions, and assisted any attempts to resolve the dispute without litigation.2 3 ° The old Act discouraged unwanted behavior by imposing costs on culpable persons in the form of time and energy needed to defend the
action, social opprobrium, legal fees, damages, and penalties. 23 1 However, the old Act imposed some costs on the aggrieved person bringing the action.23 2 Therefore, it forced the
aggrieved person to carefully balance the perceived injury
against the potential cost of seeking redress.
The amended Act 233 radically reduced the costs of bringing an action. The extensive administrative enforcement
mechanism reduced the cost significantly by allowing HUD to
be a proxy for the aggrieved person.23 4 Consequently, the aggrieved person's calculation used to determine the benefit of
bringing an action changed considerably. There is no longer
a need to consider the nature and severity of the perceived
injury, since because of the negligible cost, any perceived injury is worth prosecuting.
The difficulty arises at the point of equilibrium. Equilibrium is the point where all conduct deemed serious enough to
warrant sanction is prosecuted. Presumably, the first step in
writing a statute is to determine what type of behavior is intended to be discouraged. The statute is then written so that
the enforcement mechanism will focus directly on that level
229. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-901, 82 Stat. 81
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 27-47.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 27-47.
232. See infra text accompanying notes 244-59.
233. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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of behavior one is trying to discourage. If the statute is too
broad, it will discourage behavior that was not intended to be
affected. If it is too narrow, the statute will not reach all the
instances of the unwanted behavior.
The statute defines the conduct that society wants to
eradicate, the penalties for engaging in the conduct, damages, and the procedural hurdles that must be met prior to
bringing the action. If the statute is written correctly, it will
discourage all instances of the unwanted behavior.
If a private suit is the enforcement mechanism in the
statute, the goal would be to provide sufficient incentives for
a person to bring a suit every time he or she encounters the
target behavior. Equilibrium is achieved when the aggrieved
person, balancing the seriousness of the injury with the costs
and benefits of seeking redress, concludes that it is worthwhile to bring an action. The problem is that HUD's interpretation and implementation of the amended Act set the point
of equilibrium so low that it punishes constitutionally protected activity.
B.

The Old Act and Implicit Respect for the First
Amendment

Before the Fair Housing Act 23 5 was amended in 1988,
HUD had an ancillary role in most enforcement actions.23 6
HUD used its powers to investigate, inform, and advise. Additionally, it could mediate and conciliate between the parties.23 7 However, HUD did not directly litigate most
actions.23 8
HUD's detachment from direct prosecution was not explicitly designed to protect the First Amendment rights of in235. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-901, 82 Stat. 81
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
236. Under the old Act, HUD could prosecute "pattern and practice" actions,
but did not become directly involved in individual actions. Id. § 813(a) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Pattern and practice
was construed to mean discriminatory practices or policies that affected groups
or classes of people rather than isolated episodes that affected individuals.
Caruso & Jones, supra note 48, at 524-25. Additionally, if state or local authorities were substantively equivalent, HUD was required to refer all complaints
there first. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(c), 82 Stat. 81,
86 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
237. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-901, 82 Stat.
81 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
238. See supra note 41.
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dividuals. Legislative compromise was the primary reason
for HUD's limited role in direct prosecution. 2 39 HUD's en-

forcement power was the source of most criticism. Senator
Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) was critical of HUD's proposed
power.240 Although his motivation may have been to forestall
racial equality and maintain a segregated society, Senator
Ellender accurately foreshadowed the potential abuse of First
Amendment freedoms by giving HUD an expansive enforcement mechanism. 24 '
The compromise 242 that gave life to the first Act implicitly recognized the potential for abuse by vesting so much
power in an administrative agency. Giving HUD an ancillary
role ensured that the person with the direct vested interest in
the outcome of the dispute would be primarily responsible for
advancing the claim.
1. Costs of Filing an Action under the Old Act
When a person suffers housing discrimination,243 there
are several alternative courses of action. Each course of action has an attendant cost associated with it. 244 A person

could ignore the perceived discrimination and live elsewhere,
but he or she may have to pay the price of not being able to
live where he or she desires, in addition to suffering the psychological costs associated with discrimination. Hypothetically, a person could lash out physically against the injustice,
but, in addition to the limited certainty of winning the skir239. The initial bill contained many of the enforcement mechanisms that the
amended bill instituted. See 114 CONG. REc. 3134-35 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Ellender).
240. Id.

241. Id. Senator Ellender was concerned that too many personal liberties
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights would be infringed if too much power was
vested in the enforcement mechanism. Id.
242. The Dirksen Amendment removed most of the offending provisions that
gave HUD broad enforcement power. Id. at 4570-73.
243. This comment assumes that a person realizes they are being discriminated against. However, this is not always the case. Subtle forms of discrimination such as "steering" are not readily observable. Steering is when a person
is only shown a portion of the available housing units, mostly in an area where
his or her race is the majority.
244. The term "cost" is used broadly. The term does not necessarily directly
have to correspond with a specific outlay of actual funds. Rather, it is broad
enough to encompass the costs of hiring competent legal representation, time
and energy used to execute the lawsuit, and the psychological costs in self-esteem and self-image of suffering injustice and being powerless to seek redress.
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mish, one would have to risk incurring the potential costs of
civil and criminal penalties. Alternatively, one could file a
lawsuit against the alleged discriminator under the law of
the relevant anti-discrimination law.
Filing a lawsuit has its own set of costs that must be
weighed carefully against the perceived injustice. The degree
of discrimination, the cost and likelihood of winning a lawsuit, and the potential for recovery all play into the calculus
that determines the course of action. The law that prohibits
discrimination, orients the parties, and provides sanctions for
prohibited conduct is the equation by which a person calculates the potential costs and benefits accrued by filing a lawsuit. The law establishes the potential rewards for prevailing, the penalties for failing, and the hurdles that must be
overcome to transport the dispute to a forum where it can be
heard and adjudicated.
Prior to the passage of fair housing legislation, there was
no legal mechanism to combat housing discrimination.2 45 In
that era, theoretically, the costs of bringing a lawsuit for
housing discrimination were infinite because there was no
cause of action. Compared to life without fair housing statutes, the old Act considerably reduced the costs associated
with a discrimination case.
Initially, the old Act provided a cause of action to combat
housing discrimination. 2 46 It also limited costs by providing
an administrative forum where the dispute could be settled
without formal legal action.2 4 7 However, the administrative
forum had provisions that increased costs for the plaintiff because it did not have adequate incentives for the alleged per245. Using the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Supreme Court declared that it
was unconstitutional for cities to enact ordinances that restricted the rights of
blacks to move into certain neighborhoods. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917). However, it was not until 1948 that racially restrictive covenants
were declared unconstitutional. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Furthermore, until 1968 when Congress enacted a legislative remedy for private discrimination, housing discrimination was widespread and relatively unchecked. Kushner, supra note 41, at 1086.
246. The Supreme Court had already declared racially restrictive covenants
unenforceable, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), but the Fair Housing Act
of 1968 made it illegal to discriminate in any aspect of the sale or rental of real
property. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(d), 82 Stat. 81, 86
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
247. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810, 82 Stat. 81, 85-86
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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petrator to resolve the dispute.2 48 Without incentives for the
defendant to resolve the dispute, the alleged victim was
forced to expend more resources, in terms of time, energy,
and money, to bring the case to another forum for
resolution.2 4 9
The lack of incentives to resolve the dispute at the administrative, conciliatory phase should not be construed as
meaning that the alleged perpetrator did not incur costs. The
alleged discriminator incurs costs at every phase. Indeed,
there is a parallel cost-benefit analysis that is part of the defendant's decisionmaking process. If the charge against the
defendant is supported by competent evidence, it makes the
defense more expensive and less likely to prevail. There is an
increased incentive to settle the action prior to incurring the
costs of defense, in addition to the piling on of penalties and
damages. Alternatively, if the evidence is weak and unsubstantiated, the incentive to settle is reduced because the costs
of a successful defense are reduced below what a settlement
would cost.
Under the old Act, the only alternative if the administrative forum failed was to go to district court. 25 0 At this juncture, the cost-benefit analysis became critical. If the alleged
discriminatory conduct was serious enough, the perceived
benefit of vindication, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages not in excess of $1000,251 and potential attorney fees 2 52 would have to be adequate to convince a
person that it was worthwhile to move forward with the district court action. However, if the perceived injury was not
sufficient to overcome the anticipated costs of pursuing the
248. Kushner, supra note 41, at 1082 & n.142.
249. See id. at 1087.
250. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 810, 812, 82 Stat.
81, 85-86, 88 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
251. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812, 82 Stat. 81, 88
(1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
252. The old Act had a provision that allowed the appointment of counsel
and waiver of fees based upon need. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90284, § 812, 82 Stat. 81, 88 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Additionally, even if such a waiver was not made, the
limitation could be circumvented by concurrently filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1982
claim, which was covered by the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, and
which had no income qualification. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1993).
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action, the person would have to either internalize those
costs, or not pursue the action.
What most critics of the old Act purported to resent, was
not the alleged victim's limitations upon access to remedies,
but rather what was perceived as the prohibitive cost of access. 253 However, most of the frequently noted shortcomings
of the old Act could easily be circumvented. The limitation
upon punitive damages 254 could be neutralized by the joinder
of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 with a Title VII claim, thus
making full punitive damages available.25 5 The provision
limiting attorney fees on the basis of financial need could be
similarly neutralized.256
The ability to file concurrent claims radically reduced
many of the attendant costs of privately pursuing a fair housing claim. Despite the criticism 2 57 of the old Act's shortcomings, it still left the alleged victim in a relatively secure
position.
The amended Act further reduced the costs by having
HUD prosecute the case as a proxy.258 With the threshold of
cost reduced, the alleged victim of discrimination no longer
has to wait for an ironclad case of blatant discrimination to
pursue redress. The cost-benefit analysis now allows prosecution of even the most subtle forms of discrimination which
may be difficult to prove. Under the amended Act, the cost to
the prospective plaintiff is relatively small compared with the
potential for recovery, even when the vagaries of litigation
are considered.
The Fair Housing Amendments Act's 2 59 goal is the re-

moval of bias in the sale and rental of real property. Like
most statutes, it achieves that goal by making some behavior
more expensive than other behavior. The amended Act
reduces the cost of successfully prosecuting a housing discrimination complaint and allows the full weight of HUD's
253. See Kushner, supra note 41, at 1088.
254. The old Act limited punitive damages to $1000. Fair Housing Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812, 82 Stat. 81, 88 (1968) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
255. Kotkin, supra note 41, at 760-61.
256. Id. at 761.
257. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
258. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
259. 42 U.S.C. 88 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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administrative power to come to bear on the defendant, which
correspondingly increases the costs for those who
discriminate.
The amended Act influences behavior from both directions, providing a disincentive in the form of legal costs, damages, time, energy, and societal opprobrium for the person
who discriminates. It provides an incentive for bringing an
action in the form of damages, vindication and choice of housing. However, the amended Act, as it is currently enforced by
HUD, may have lowered the threshold to the point where it
provides severe disincentives for constitutionally protected
behavior.
2.

The Amended Act and the Elimination of All Costs
for Plaintiffs

The amended Act essentially removes all costs associated
with prosecuting a housing discrimination action.26 ° While
all or most of the costs are removed for the potential plaintiff,
the potential defendant remains vulnerable because the
choice is either incurring the costs of a defense, which even if
meritorious will still be quite costly, or conciliating and
agreeing to stop the perceived offending behavior. This is
precisely the goal of the drafters and supporters of the
amended Act. 26 1 However, the difficulty is that under cur-

rent enforcement policy, the web is cast too broadly, thereby
forcing the defendant to undertake a time-consuming and
costly defense, or cease to exercise a constitutionally guaranteed right, that of free speech.
Costs for the potential plaintiff are reduced, and the concurrent costs for the potential defendant are increased by a
variety of measures. The amended Act defines an aggrieved
person as "any person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice; or believes that such person
will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is
about to occur."262 Not only can the victim of discrimination

bring an action, but a third party26 3 also has standing to file
260. See supra text accompanying note 61.
261. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
262. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1)-(2) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).

263. The term "third party" defines a diverse group. It could be a person
with a vested interest in the sale of real estate, a housing advocacy group, a
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suit.2 64 By allowing third parties to sue because of discrimination or in anticipation of discrimination, the statute sought
to broaden the means used to effectuate an important public
policy.
By allowing third parties to file suit,2 65 the statute broadened the class of persons who would be able to shift to the
potential defendant the costs associated with any conduct
which could be construed as discriminatory. The expanded
pool of potential plaintiffs increases the chances that offending conduct will be observed. Increased observation provides
more opportunities to file actions to stop such behavior. Ostensibly, this seems like a sensible way to reduce the instances of discrimination. However, if the conduct which is
prohibited is loosely defined, and if there is no requirement
for investment of any resources to prosecute a claim, there is
tremendous potential for abuse.
The amended Act allows claims to be brought alleging
"interference."2 6 6 The tort of interference requires a showing
of intentional disruption of potential economic advantage.2 6 7
There is no requirement to show that the defendant harbored
ill will towards the plaintiff.26 8 Courts have expanded the liability for tortious interference, 26 9 and HUD adopted that
broad interpretation in its prosecution of cases of housing
discrimination.2
Traditionally, the courts have seen interference in terms
of denial, or de facto denial of housing to certain groups by
another more powerful group.2 7 1 This denial usually had a
physical component, where discriminators would not only attempt to coercively disrupt the purchase or sale, but would
disabled persons advocacy group, or a person of good will who witnesses
discrimination.
264. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
265. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
266. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3618 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
267. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at §§ 129-130.
268. Id.
269. See generally D. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with ContractualRelationships, 34 ARK. L. REv. 335 (1980).
270. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
271. See People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Va.
1992) (defining coercion as a situation where the full weight of the city is
brought to bear and where criminal and other types of investigations are
threatened in order to discourage third parties from helping minorities find
suitable housing).
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also physically threaten potential buyers or sellers.2 72 HUD's
recent cases illustrate that it has accepted a broad definition
of interference that only has a verbal component. 2 73 HUD ignored the potential First Amendment conflicts and allowed
claims to be filed using the broad definition of interference
that included competitive bidding on property2 74 and political
activism.2 7 5
Allowing such broad claims effectively reduced the cost of
filing a complaint for the prospective plaintiff to the point
where it invites abuse. Imposing some costs upon the plaintiff serves as a means to weed out meritless claims. By entertaining broad claims of interference, HUD is used as a vehicle
to chill the First Amendment rights of individuals. For instance, a homeowner legitimately protesting the over-concentration of facilities for recovering substance abusers can have
the threat of a HUD investigation and eventual litigation imposed by literally anyone in the community, which can subse27 6
quently stifle the otherwise legitimate protest.
Conciliation is most often the result of housing discrimination claims, because a defendant who resists faces an expensive and protracted legal battle with a large federal bureaucracy, in which the best possible outcome would be a
victory on the merits. The worst outcome would be to lose on
the merits and face damage awards, fines, and extraordinary
legal expenses. Few individuals can afford the expense and
time that such litigation entails.
Therefore, even when convinced that they are in the
right, conciliation is often the only practical alternative for
defendants. The threat is effective because all the costs are
shifted to the defendant. The prospective plaintiff, undeterred by procedural hurdles, can file a complaint with HUD and
let HUD use a variety of coercive tactics to force the defendant to conciliate.
HUD's enforcement data to some extent illustrates the
effect that the amended Act's enforcement procedures had on
272. See Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1991).
273. See supra note 22.
274. See Foderaro, supra note 22, at B1 (A coalition of homeowners proposed
to buy a building that was slated to become a homeless shelter. Competitive
bidding with a housing advocacy group led to HUD investigation.).
275. See MacDonald, supra note 22, at B13.
276. See supra note 22.
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potential defendants.2 1 7 In 1988, the year prior to the
amended Act's implementation, 4658 cases of housing discrimination were reported to HUD, which in turn referred
3308 to state and local agencies. 8 Of the 1350 complaints
handled by HUD, 214, or approximately fifteen percent of the
complaints, settled by conciliation. 9
In 1989, the first year the amended Act was implemented, 7174 complaints were filed, 3952 were handled by
HUD, and the remainder of the complaints were sent to state
and local jurisdictions. 28 0 There was a significant rise in the
number of conciliations. Over 860, or twenty-five percent, of
the complaints handled by HUD conciliated. However, only
nineteen of the ninety-one, approximately twenty percent, of
the cases sent to the Office of General Counsel for cause determinations were determined to have reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination occurred.2 S1
In 1990, 7675 complaints were filed, of which 4457 were
handled by HUD.28 2 HUD again reported a significant rise in
the number of cases successfully conciliated.28 3 Of the complaints handled by HUD, over 1700, or thirty-eight percent,
conciliated. Meanwhile, the number of cause determinations
dropped to approximately ten percent.2 8 4
There is a significant correlation between the behavior of
both defendants and plaintiffs and the implementation of the
amended Act. Over ninety-five percent of all the complaints
filed in 1989 were filed after the amended Act's effective
277. The data is raw and there is no attempt to establish a direct correlation
between HUD's new enforcement procedures and the tendency for defendants
to capitulate. There are many factors that could affect the rate of conciliation.
However, the increase in conciliation correlates with the passage of the
amended Act, but the data is not conclusive enough to prove causation. To
prove causation would require a regression analysis that would hold constant
variables that could affect the correlation between enforcement procedures and
the subsequent increase in conciliation. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of
this comment. See DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING:
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 808(E)(2) OF THE FAIR HOUSING

ACT (1989).

278. HUD Releases FY 1988 Complaint Statistics, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
Rep. (P-H) 1 8.11 (1989).
279. Id.
280. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 61, at 15.
281. Id.
282. Ware, supra note 41, at 107.
283. Id. at 103, 107-08.
284. Of the 769 cases referred to the General Counsel for cause determinations, only 80 were determined to have cause. Id. at 107-08.
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date.28 5 Certainly, there was strong motivation to take advantage of either the strengthened enforcement provisions or
the expanded classes of protection in the amended Act. However, what is disturbing is that while the number of conciliations continues to rise, the number of corresponding cause determinations continues to decrease.
The steady increase in conciliations and the accompanying steady decrease in the number of cause determinations
should be cause for concern. What this may mean is that defendants, realizing the possible expense of resisting a complaint, are merely capitulating to the demands of the plaintiffs via HUD's enforcement mechanism. The quick
resolution of a dispute is advantageous if the plaintiff encountered bona fide discrimination. However, if defendants are
exercising constitutionally protected rights and are merely
capitulating to government demands to cease and desist, the
number of conciliations should cause alarm.
3. The HUD SLAPP
The amended Act and its subsequent implementation,
while well-intentioned, has combined with certain forces in
the fair housing community to chill legitimate debate upon
important subjects of public policy. Housing advocates, with
HUD as an accomplice, have seized upon provisions in the
Act that allow extraordinary costs to be imposed upon dissenting views within the community. The absence of meaningful pleading or procedural hurdles, the employment of
HUD's enormous resources, and the broad interpretation of
"interference" can work in combination to allow SLAPPs to be
filed against persons otherwise exercising free speech.
Housing advocates soon gave in to the irresistible temptation to initiate a HUD action upon encountering any community resistance to a proposed housing development.28 6
The resistance offered by members of the community was not
typically the kind that the statute was designed to combat.28 7
285.

DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 16, at 13.
286. See FairHousing Issues, supra note 4.
287. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. The statute was ostensibly passed to stop the physical, organized, or state sponsored terrorism
designed to prevent a certain class of persons from enjoying constitutionally
protected rights. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat.
81, 81 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
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Courts have held that although interference, along with coercion or intimidation do not have to involve physical
threats,2 SS they must at least involve illegitimate and forceful
efforts to deny a person housing, based solely based upon
membership in a protected class.28 9
However, HUD's acceptance of a much broader interpretation of interference allowed complaints to be filed without
evidence or substantiation. 2 90 By allowing such complaints,

HUD has unwittingly allowed aggressive housing advocates
to impose costs upon persons merely exercising the right to
free speech, thereby chilling public debate. The imposition of
these costs in the form of time, energy, legal fees, and deterioration of community standing are made with impunity.
Although the conciliation process involves extensive legal
costs for the defendant, the process does not involve a formal
complaint being filed and therefore, frivolous allegations are
not sanctioned. 29 '
What is revealing is that of the thirty-four cases that
HUD identified as involving First Amendment issues,
twenty-three were dismissed for no cause.292 The remaining
eleven complaints did not involve protected speech and were
not considered.293 Essentially, 100% of the cases involving
free speech did not have the factual basis to conclude that
discrimination occurred.
Allowing these claims soon led to adverse publicity.2 94
Trying to blunt charges of insensitivity to the First Amendment, HUD issued new guidelines that purportedly protected
free speech while still affording HUD the opportunity to attack housing discrimination.295
288. People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733 n.5
(E.D. Va. 1992).
289. Richmond's use of police and other agencies to threaten criminal and
other sanctions, without basis in law or fact, was determined to fall within the
category of coercion, interference, and intimidation. Id.
290. FairHousing Issues, supra note 4.
291. Sanctions only apply to the filing of an actual complaint. See FED. R.
CIv. P. 11.
292. Letter to Robert F. Hoyt, supra note 89, at 1.
293. Id.
294. See Intimidating PoliticalProtest, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at A16;
Foderaro, supra note 22; MacDonald, supra note 22; Rosen, supra note 22.
295. See Memorandum from Roberta Achtenburg, supra note 130.
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C. Weaknesses of the New Guidelines
The new guidelines assert HUD's belief in the primacy of
the First Amendment. The guidelines state that HUD will
not accept complaints of coercion, interference, and intimidation if they involve public activities designed to achieve governmental action, and if they do not involve force or threats of
force.296 Additionally, any complaints based upon coercion,
interference, or intimidation will not be accepted without
prior approval from HUD headquarters.29 v Regardless of the
emphatic statements about respect for free speech, the exceptions to the guidelines eviscerate the protection that they are
purportedly designed to promote.
The guidelines only apply to a very narrow subset of the
public that could theoretically become involved in housing issues within their town or city. Specifically, the guidelines
only apply to third parties not directly involved with any real
estate transactions.298 Therefore, under the new guidelines,
any attempt to directly intervene in any real estate transaction that could tangentially affect a protected class could be
cause for a HUD investigation. Of course, this leaves the possibility that HUD could become involved in any free market
transaction involving a protected class of individuals and a
third party. Former actions by HUD illustrate that any attempt to outbid an organization who plans to use the subject
property for housing a protected class could be construed as
interference.299
Under the broad definition of interference adopted by
HUD, any social service or housing advocacy providers wishing to acquire real estate could merely threaten any other
bidder with HUD action and effectively raise the cost of property beyond the normal market cost for the third party. The
cost for the third party would increase because, in addition to
the cost of the property, the third party would have to balance
the defense costs against a potential fair housing complaint
as a transaction cost.
HUD also makes it clear that although it will not personally prosecute actions based upon alleged third party viola296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Foderaro, supra note 22.
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tions of section 3618,0 it still encourages persons to exercise
the option of a private action.3 0 1 However, no mention is
made of the availability of attorney fees and costs for plaintiffs bringing such actions, while the presumption is that
under the statute they are still available. 02
The most important exception is that all of the protections presumably provided by the guidelines are null and void
if an individual files a lawsuit. 0 3 For example, assume there
has been some irregularity on the zoning board, such as an
apparent conflict of interest. If a person files a lawsuit trying
to compel another zoning board vote on the proposed sale of
city-owned property to a housing advocacy group, the mere
filing of a lawsuit can result in a HUD investigation. HUD
carefully crafted the guidelines so that all public actions that
are acceptable under First Amendment jurisprudence (e.g.,
peaceful public demonstrations, letters to the editor, circulating petitions, and participating in town meetings) are protected, unless that public action involves a lawsuit.3 4 Essentially, HUD said that free speech is acceptable, but
petitioning the government via the courts is not.
HUD allows the cost-shifting mechanism of the amended
Act to effectively prohibit public interest lawsuits by forcing
potential public interest plaintiffs to fight a two-front war. °
When a person files a public interest lawsuit, he or she must
not only try to win the initial action, but must also try to fend
off a housing discrimination complaint prosecuted by a wellfunded, professional federal agency. By radically increasing
the cost of litigation, HUD places the last - and most realistic - line of defense3 0 6 an individual has against government
300. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3618 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
301. See Memorandum from Roberta Achtenburg, supra note 130.
302. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
303. See Memorandum from Roberta Achtenburg, supra note 130.
304. See id.
305. The plaintiff is the party that initially filed the public interest lawsuit
only to have a HUD complaint filed against him, almost as a countersuit. The
HUD complaint thereby forces the plaintiff to prosecute two lawsuits, one as a
plaintiff and one as a defendant.
306. It is unrealistic to think that individual protest, or even small community protest, could garner the influence to deter legislative action through conventional means. Assuming sufficient protest could be mounted to get the attention of elected officials, there is still most likely the problem of time lag
between the controversial action and an election. Without access to the courts,
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collusion, violations of valid zoning restrictions, and dump30
ing, 307 beyond most people's means. 1
Additionally, municipalities are not covered by the guidelines, so presumably any protest actions that occur in the city
could subject the managers and elected officials to time consuming and expensive litigation with HUD. 30 9 For example,
if a citizens group organizes a peaceful protest or petition
drive, activities that are protected under the guidelines, HUD
could hold the city managers responsible for the protest and
file a housing discrimination complaint against the city. Essentially, HUD allows the individuals in the city to exercise
their First Amendment rights, but it construes that exercise
as housing discrimination and holds the city where the protest took place responsible.
Once the city or city managers are implicated in the
HUD investigation, the individual protections offered by the
new guidelines are easily circumvented. Using the generous
complaint amendment provisions of the amended Act, a potential complainant could amend the complaint and allege
that the city managers conspired with the individual protesters. By using conspiracy and impleading individuals, the
HUD investigation and subsequent chilling effect could be
"bootstrapped" upon a person exercising constitutionally protected rights.
Even if HUD decides not to investigate persons filing
public interest lawsuits, there is no protection if those lawsuits fail. The guidelines make no reference to HUD's ability
individuals can only stop offending actions by electing someone more sympathetic to their views. The more distant an election, the more diminished the
political power of the individual becomes. In other words, by the time the individual's protest can be translated into action, the offending development will
most likely be operating and the individual's protest moot.
307. "Dumping" is used to describe situations in which one neighborhood is
forced to accept a disproportionate share of group homes and other residential
treatment facilities.
308. Attempting to litigate against HUD with its multi-million dollar budget
and cadre of experienced attorneys would be extraordinarily expensive.
Housing cases are, in essence, the federal government against the defendant. The government is represented by its elite litigation corps DOJ [Department of Justice]. The attorneys at DOJ are specialists recruited in a highly selective process. Moreover, there is no fair housing
bar comparable to the employment and labor bars at HUD.
Ware, supra note 41, at 112.
309. See Memorandum from Roberta Achtenburg, supra note 130.
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to investigate retroactively and prosecute.3 1 0 Even if HUD
postpones its investigation, there is no prohibition on a subsequent investigation and prosecution if the person's lawsuit
does not prevail. HUD could, after the fact, assert that the
lawsuit itself was discrimination, proof of which would be the
fact that it failed on the merits. HUD could chill the right to
petition merely by suggesting that any lawsuits that do not
prevail will be construed as frivolous and will subject the person who filed it to an investigation.31
Finally, the guidelines issued by HUD are not administrative rules. Issuance of rules requires notice and comment,
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,3 1 2 and cannot
be changed or modified unilaterally. However, guidelines do
not have those procedural protections and can be changed at
any time and for any reason.3 1 3
Admittedly, the guidelines provide a modicum of protection for the freedom of speech. Unfortunately, they create a
minor, but easily circumvented, procedural hurdle against
the imposition of a SLAPP action against free speech. However, there are several other alternatives that would protect
the freedom of speech and allow for vigorous prosecution of
bona fide instances of housing discrimination.
IV.

PROPOSAL

Allowing aggressive housing advocates to steamroll public discourse should be neither the objective nor practice of
HUD's administration of this country's fair housing laws.
The difficulty is that the conflict pits two fundamental constitutional rights against each other: (1) the defendant's right
of free speech and petition, and (2) the plaintiff's right to seek
housing free from invidious discrimination.
A significant part of the problem lies in trying to determine if a complaint filed with HUD is bona fide, or just an
attempt to stifle public discourse. That determination by its
nature is fact-dependent and would require a preliminary investigation just to determine the merit of the claim. The investigation could be chilling in itself, thereby ironically sti310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
See Telephone Interview with Roger Conner, supra note 15.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
See Telephone Interview with Roger Connor, supra note 15.
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fling protest in an attempt to determine whether that was the
motivation behind the initial complaint.
Manipulating the definition of a SLAPP runs the risk of
being too broad and thereby eliminating some legitimate discrimination suits. Alternatively, using a narrow definition
allows too many SLAPPs to be brought. Consequently, the
only way to control SLAPPs and maintain a vigorous antidiscrimination policy is to narrow access to HUD's enforcement machinery and expedite dismissal of meritless claims.
A.

Narrowing Access to HUD

These solutions to HUD SLAPPs are designed to filter access to HUD's enforcement machinery. They are relatively
minor and must be used in conjunction with a revised set of
administrative rules based upon the sham exception under
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.
Specific Pleading of Complaints

1.

Historically, courts have been hesitant to require a
heightened standard for pleading.3 1 ' However, it has been
suggested that pleadings should be more specific when First
Amendment rights are involved.3 15 HUD currently seems to
allow an even more liberal standard than the short and plain
that is
statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief
16
required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3
If HUD were to require more specificity in the initial
complaint, it would have a two-fold benefit. First, it would
allow most meritless claims to be dismissed and avoid the
SLAPP controversy. Second, it would allow HUD to preserve
resources to better prosecute legitimate claims.
2.

Noerr-Pennington as a FilteringDevice

HUD should interpret the statute using Noerr-Pennington as a lens. Traditionally, courts use Noerr-Pennington
to protect the rights of individuals to petition the government
without running afoul of antitrust legislation.3 17 However,
HUD could use Noerr-Pennington in the same manner, allowing individuals in the community to petition the govern314.
315.
316.
317.

See Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
Id. at 47 (Neely, J., dissenting).
FED. R. CIv. P. 8.
See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text.
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ment, including by filing suit without running afoul of fair
housing legislation. HUD would refrain from investigating
the actions of the group or individual petitioning the government unless the petition was merely a sham to camouflage
discriminatory conduct.
HUD should define the conduct that is protected by First
Amendment rights more broadly to include filing suit. Under
the Noerr-Pennington exception, filing suit would be allowed
as long as the litigation did not operate as a sham to mask
discriminatory conduct.
The sham exception articulated in California Motor
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited38" extended Noerr-Pennington to all departments of the government, including the
courts. 3 19 Although critics have been quick to point out that

the sham exception articulated in CaliforniaMotor Transport
is not significantly more clear than when it was first articu3 20 it is valuable as part of an overall strategy
lated in Noerr,

to limit frivolous lawsuits.
The sham exception "encompasses situations in which
person use the governmental process - as opposed to the
outcome of the process -

as an anti-competitive weapon."321

For example, frivolous objections that are repeatedly filed
solely to clog the judicial apparatus through added delay and
expense, are not protected under Noerr.322
Similarly, HUD could use the same standard to determine whether filing suit in objection to a housing initiative is
merely an exercise of a person's right of petition, or an attempt to deny housing to a protected class. Of course, a sham
determination is a question of degree, and to some extent a
factual question. However, using its current investigatory
tactics, HUD could investigate serial filings less obtrusively
than it could investigate generalized accusations of housing
discrimination.
The sham exception as applied is not a mathematical determinant. It merely allows the presumption of legitimacy to
reside with the citizen who files the lawsuit. Allowing that
318.
319.
320.
321.
(1991).
322.

California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
Id. at 515
See Waldman, supra note 134, at 1004-05.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380
CaliforniaMotor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511-12.
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presumption does not unfairly disadvantage the individual,
advocate, or governmental body who had the suit filed
against them. First, the person objecting to the housing development must undertake the costs of filing the suit, and he
32 3
or she must file the suit in good faith or face sanctions.
Second, the person must prevail on the merits.
Of course, HUD could step in if the person filing the suits
is just using the right to petition to impose expense and delay
in order to effectuate illegal discrimination. Noerr's sham exception provides a convenient rule of thumb that separates
the well-meaning person exercising constitutional rights,
from the culpable person attempting to use the governmental
process to discriminate. Forcing HUD to use Noerr as a guide
for when to step in, allows a person of good faith to participate in public discourse without having to fight a two-front
war.
B.

Accelerated Dismissals
1. In General

In response to the proliferation of SLAPP suits and their
corrosive effect upon public discourse, California recently
passed an anti-SLAPP bill. 2 4 The bill does not limit access
to the courts, but instead provides a mechanism to dismiss
these actions early in the contest to avoid imposing unnecessary costs on the defendant.3 25 By preventing the plaintiff
from imposing costs upon the defendant, the primary weapon
of the SLAPP has been eliminated. HUD could establish a
formal rule pursuant to its statutory rule-making authority
that would allow for rapid dismissal prior to a potentially
chilling HUD investigation.
2.

HUD Anti-SLAPP Rule

The HUD rule should be based upon a modified California anti-SLAPP statute. 32 6 The California statute states that
any cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or
free speech in connection with a public issue, shall be subject
323.
324.
325.
326.

See FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1996).
Id.
Id.
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The proposed rule could read

as follows:
Proposed Rule for Dealing With Housing Discrimination
Complaints that Have First Amendment Implications

(a) The Department of Housing and Urban Development finds and declares that there has been a disturbing
increase in housing discrimination complaints brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights
of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances.
(b) A housing discrimination complaint arising from
any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right
of free speech or petition shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the Secretary determines that there
is a substantial probability that the complainant will prevail on the claim. In making the determination, the Secretary will consider the complaint, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or
defense is based.
(1) The Secretary's ruling in subsection (b) is subject
to judicial review by the district court in the district where
the action is filed.
(c) As used in this section, "act in the furtherance of a
person's right of petition or free speech" includes any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. It shall not include any act
that includes a physical element and that is intended to
intimidate or coerce.
(d) All discovery proceedings in the action shall be
stayed upon the filing of a motion made pursuant to this
be noticed not more than thirty
section. A hearing32shall
8
days after service.
Critics will point out that, without a preliminary investigation, there is no way to determine whether a housing discrimination complaint will have a "substantial probability" of
success. There is some validity to that criticism, and it is addressed by using several procedural devices that expedite determination of a claim's merit.
327. Id.

328. This model code is based loosely on California's anti-SLAPP statute.
See id.

1144

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

The difficulty with dismissing the complaint at the pleading stage is that the complaint, no matter how cursory or general, usually states some claim that should at least be investigated. Additionally, courts usually only dismiss complaints
at this stage if "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle him or her to relief."32 9 The requirement for more specific pleading will eliminate some of the frivolous complaints,
but there is still a problem with complaints on the margin.
Complaints that have some possibility of being bona fide
will have to be investigated. However, HUD's investigations
have already been shown to have a chilling effect upon free
speech and the right of petition. 33 0 Giving the person who is
subjected to a HUD complaint the ability to make a special
motion to strike would protect against illegitimate complaints spawning full-fledged HUD investigations. Additional protection would be provided by the automatic stay of
discovery upon filing the special motion to strike. 3 1
The protection from frivolous complaints would come
from HUD adopting a summary judgment "in reverse" standard for dismissal at this stage. Summary judgment "in reverse," rather than requiring the defendant (in this case the
person against whom the HUD complaint was filed) to defeat
the plaintiff's pleading by showing it is legally or factually
meritless, requires that the plaintiff (the person who filed the
complaint) demonstrate that he or she possess a legally sufficient claim.32
V.

CONCLUSION

The Fair Housing Amendments Act is a valuable tool to
combat discrimination. It provides a variety of enforcement
options, realistic penalties, and sufficient remedies. However, if HUD continues to abuse its enforcement mechanisms,
allowing the Act to bludgeon and stifle legitimate, nonviolent
political discourse on important public issues, portions of the
Act may be declared unconstitutional.
329.
Supp.
330.
22.
331.
332.

Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F.
1268, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Foderaro, supra note 22; MacDonald, supra note 22; Rosen, supra note
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West Supp. 1996).
College Hosp. v. Superior Court, 882 P.2d 890, 903 (Cal. 1994).
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Ultimately, what could occur would be the least attractive option. The courts, fearing the backlash from vested interests and lacking the moral courage to confront an issue
that falls under "civil rights," would not declare the Act unconstitutional. The Act would continue to be implemented as
is, skillfully avoiding the media spotlight, but still indiscriminately punishing the innocent as well as the culpable. Finally, as the numbers of innocent persons caught in its web
grow, the Act would lose its high moral ground.
The historic struggle of those who established this legislation would be irrevocably tarnished and their noble legacy
lost. The Act would no longer stand for the maxim that all
Americans deserve to be judged on the content of their character and not on the color of their skin. Instead, a disenchanted public would view it as simply another bureaucratic tool used by the apparatchiks to stifle dissent.
John V. Picone III*
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support.

